



CENTRE FOR SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIC STUDIES  
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**ANALYSIS FOR AN UPDATE OF THE LONG TERM  
PERSPECTIVE FOR DEFENCE 2030:  
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

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# **ANALYSIS FOR AN UPDATE OF THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE FOR DEFENCE 2030**

**STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

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The report has been prepared on the basis of a request from the Deputy Minister for the DPSP (Defence Policy and Strategy Division) management dated 25 January 2018, *Data for the revision of the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030* (hereinafter referred to as “LTP”). (Ref. no. MO 21653/2018-3691)

By clarifying the requirement of the DPSD, the following analysis objectives have been defined:

- Collect, analyse and subsequently transmit relevant strategic and conceptual documents from designated states to DPSD of the Ministry of Defence.
- Perform a comparative analysis of these documents and evaluate the relevance of these documents in terms of comparability with LTP.
- Identify topics for updating the LTP related to its nature and content.
- Develop strategic alternatives for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (hereinafter also referred to as the “Czech Armed Forces”) in the horizon of LTP 2035.

The results of the initial analyses were discussed at the Ministry of Defence, DPSD on 9<sup>th</sup> May 2018.

The report is divided into the following sections:

- Summary
- Comparative analysis of the documents of selected countries
- Recommendations for modifying the LTP
- Strategic alternatives for the development of the armed forces 2035

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## A. SUMMARY

The report contains the comparative analysis results of strategic documents of selected countries, a set of recommendations for updating the LTP and proposals and evaluation of strategic alternatives for the development of the Czech Armed Forces 2035. The CBVSS developed its own methodologies for the analyses and they are part of the report. The techniques of comparative analysis, strategic benchmarking and scenario creation were used.

### Comparative Analysis of Strategic Documents

- Its concept (purpose and content) distinguishes the LTP from the set of analysed documents. Its title expresses the ambition to direct the development of the state defence system, the content is mostly concerned with the development of the Czech Armed Forces. The LTP has a more general character and based on the methodology it uses, it is rather a strategy. The level of detail of the LTP varies considerably in its individual passages.
- By its character, LTP is approaching The White Paper on Defence and National Security (France), The White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Germany) and the Defence Policy of Canada. These documents occupy a central position in the hierarchy of strategic documents and have the character (purpose) of the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic.
- The structure of the assessed documents is to a large degree identical. All documents contain security threats, strategic principles, capabilities requirements, capabilities structure and financial resources (100%). Other areas are represented as follows: personnel resources (91%), principles of the armed forces development (82%), material resources (82%), operations (64%), other elements of the state defence system (55%) and defence industry (45%).
- If the LTP should play a role in accordance with RMO 66/2012, it is appropriate to approximate its character to the “Proactive” and “Specific” areas, i.e. “Concept” (Annexe 2). The LTP should draw inspiration from the documents Defence Agreement 2018-2023 (Denmark), In the Interest of the Netherlands, Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, Long-Term Defence Development Plan with Emphasis on Building and Developing the SVK Armed Forces with an Outlook to 2030, National Defence Strategy (USA) and National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (UK).

### Recommendations for Updating the Long Term Perspective 2035

- It is necessary to define the nature (purpose) of the document (whether it relates to the Czech Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, or the defence as a whole) and its position in the hierarchy of strategic documents. It is recommended to narrow it to the departmental development concept following the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic dealing with all areas of strategic management (creating a framework for defining strategic objectives), defining the political direction of the development of the Czech Armed Forces and framing the source aspects.

- Defence policy principles need to be updated and expanded (in particular, to include the outcomes of summits and developments in NATO and the EU (PESCO). It is also important to incorporate the reaction to the modified political-military ambitions, the requirement to increase the number of Czech Armed Forces by 5,000 soldiers<sup>1</sup> and requirements arising from Capability Targets 2017 - above all the formation of a heavy brigade by 2026.
- The main trends in the security environment are essentially in line with how other countries perceive the security environment. It is appropriate to consider partial adjustments that highlight or clarify some of the already reflected threats and their tendencies (increasing or decreasing importance).
- In addition to security threats, opportunities to develop capabilities (multinational cooperation, technological development) should also be considered. And also, not to forget the demographic development and its impact on the Czech Armed Forces.
- To better interconnect security threats with implications for defence and use and development of the Czech Armed Forces (tasks, operational environment and military implications).
- Depending on the concept of LTP, consider adding new or extend existing chapters:
  - elaborate in detail the tasks of the armed forces (not to be limited to the full spectrum of operations);
  - evaluate military implications in terms of armed forces usage in the future operating environment;
  - include the principles of development (importance of timely reaction, availability of reserves and supplies for the needs of build up into a wartime structure...);
  - institutional adaptation of the Ministry of Defence.
- Improve the overall graphical processing and visualization of information in order to enhance the attractiveness of the document for the public, following the example of foreign documents.

Strategic Alternatives of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic 2035

- Based on the analysis of strategic documents of foreign partners in terms of current and planned capabilities of armed forces in the long term (through 18 evaluation criteria), the following trends are evident:
  - strong tendency for most countries to gradually increase their forces numbers;
  - growing need to prepare forces for a conflict with state and non-state (asymmetric) actors;
  - growing need to strengthen heavy land forces at the expense of the light forces;

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<sup>1</sup> Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic 2017. Available at: [http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id\\_40001\\_50000/46088/Obrann\\_strategie\\_2017\\_-\\_CZ.pdf](http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/Obrann_strategie_2017_-_CZ.pdf)

- increasing importance of armed forces engagement in the airspace and cyberspace;
  - need for capabilities to operate globally without climate and geographical constraints;
  - need to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP;
  - commitment to realistically achieve a 20% share of investments in the defence budget;
  - need to improve the technological level of the armed forces equipment and armament used.
- Strategic alternatives of the Czech Armed Forces development in the horizon of 2035 take into account strategic planning assumptions (7 certainties) and driving forces (4 uncertainties):
    - Shared forces for a cooperating world (Pink scenario);
    - Cooperating forces for a contemporary world (Pragmatic scenario);
    - Sovereign forces for a fragmented world (Black scenario).
  - Strategic alternatives were assessed on the basis of the following criteria: the level of risk for ensuring the defence of the state; the nature of forces (global - territorial engagement); model of the forces (voluntariness); capabilities and technology (level of specialization and level of technological development); the size of the forces; defence spending; industry (level of international cooperation) and decision-making autonomy (supranational x national decision-making level).

#### 1. Shared Forces for a Cooperating World (Pink scenario)

The scenario is characterized by deepening of international cooperation, including the strengthening of the EU's strategic autonomy and the credibility of the collective defence mechanism as well as ensuring strong transatlantic ties. The joint development of capabilities makes it possible to maintain a smaller, professional army. The armed forces capabilities are shared, with some degree of specialization, modernised and interoperable. This allows for a decrease in defence spending and at the same time increase in efficiency which leads to higher technological maturity. This is further strengthened by the common European market in defence technology. There is a low level of risk when ensuring the country's defence. However, self-decision-making capacity is limited in favour of the transnational level.

#### 2. Cooperating Forces for a Contemporary World (Pragmatic scenario)

The second form of armed forces is based on the assumption that ensuring defence is primarily the responsibility of the national state. The Czech Republic's defence capability continues to depend on the collective defence mechanism. Cooperation within NATO is characterized by greater uncertainty and lower coherence between the US and the European pillar. The armed forces are preparing for a possible need to defend themselves on their own, for a limited period of time. Emphasis is placed on developing a balanced set of capabilities with a focus on land forces and their support. The armed forces development is characterized by partial specialization and efforts to increase interoperability with the allies. Capabilities are only partially shared. Despite the budget increase and the share of investments, the technological potential of armed forces

development remains unused (development of a large set of capabilities). The Czech Republic retains sovereignty in deciding on the use and development of forces. At the same time, it accepts greater responsibility for ensuring its own defence capability. Promoting the country's vital and strategic interests is associated with a higher level of risk.

### 3. Sovereign Forces for a Fragmented World (Black scenario)

The third scenario is embedded in an increasingly fragmented world. The allies' will to seek common solutions and meet collective defence obligations is diminishing. However, this is not sufficiently offset by deepening of the common defence policy within the EU. The Czech Republic must develop its capability to defend itself independently. The size of the armed forces is increased (while transitioning to partial or complete conscription) and the full spectrum of capabilities is developed. This, together with the low level of international cooperation in the defence industry, leads to technological stagnation. In this setting, the Czech Republic is autonomous in decision-making on defence matters. However, the risks to defending one's own interests are high.

Based on the evaluation of individual strategic alternatives of armed forces development, in the given situation, it seems appropriate for the Czech Republic to move towards scenario 2. It allows for a reasonable balance of capabilities, specialization of forces and strengthening of quality (technological and personnel). The core of such armed forces will be land forces with a high degree of readiness and versatility with complex support services and the possibility of their reinforcement (mobilization and allied forces).

In the horizon of the LTP 2035, it is unlikely to achieve the Czech Armed Forces target model no. 1. A limiting factor is the pace of gradual strengthening of the EU's strategic autonomy as a complementary element of ready-for-action NATO.

On the contrary, the Czech Armed Forces model 3 is associated with the lowest guarantees and highest costs for the defence of the country. This model will not be able to benefit sufficiently from effective international cooperation. It represents a high-risk option in terms of securing the defence of the state.

## B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES

The following strategic and conceptual documents were evaluated:

- Belgium (The Strategic Vision for Defence)<sup>2</sup>;
- Denmark (Defence Agreement 2018 - 2023)<sup>3</sup>;
- France (White Paper on Defence and National Security)<sup>4</sup>;
- Canada (Canada's Defence Policy)<sup>5</sup>;
- Netherlands (In the interest of the Netherlands)<sup>6</sup>;
- Germany (White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr)<sup>7</sup>;
- Austria (Military Strategic Concept 2017)<sup>8</sup>;
- Poland (Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland)<sup>9</sup>;
- Slovakia (Long-Term Defence Development Plan with Emphasis on Building and Developing the SVK Armed Forces with an Outlook to 2030)<sup>10</sup>;
- United Kingdom (National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015)<sup>11</sup>;
- USA (National Defense Strategy 2018)<sup>12</sup>.

Portugal (Defesa 2020) and Hungary (Zryinii 2026) were excluded from the originally requested countries. In Portugal, the reason was the irrelevance of the document since it is outdated in terms of its content and does not reflect the current security environment (written before 2013). The Hungarian document was secret and therefore inaccessible through open sources. Above the original framework, Canada was included in the sample, due to the traditionally high quality and inspiring level of its strategy papers.

The results of the comparative analysis reflect different national approaches to strategic document processing (purpose, concept, content and place in the hierarchy of strategic documents). Most countries do not have the equivalent of the LTP or their content and function are shared by multiple documents.

The above research sample was analysed in two areas: (1) the purpose and nature of the documents and (2) the content of the documents.

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<sup>2</sup><http://www.vandepub.be/sites/default/files/articles/The%20strategic%20vision%20for%20Defence.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.fmn.dk/temaer/forsvarsforlig/Documents/danish-defence-agreement-2018-2023-pdfa.pdf>

<sup>4</sup><http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/215253/2394121/file/White%20paper%20on%20defence%202013.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.defensie.nl/binaries/defensie/documenten/beleidsnota-s/2013/09/17/in-the-interest-of-the-netherlands/in-the-interest-of-the-netherlands.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/white-paper-german-security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr>

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf\\_pool/publikationen/msk2017.pdf](http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/msk2017.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> [http://en.mon.gov.pl/p/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2017/07/korp\\_web\\_13\\_06\\_2017.pdf](http://en.mon.gov.pl/p/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2017/07/korp_web_13_06_2017.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [https://www.mod.gov.sk/data/.../3561\\_dlhodoby-plan-2017.docx](https://www.mod.gov.sk/data/.../3561_dlhodoby-plan-2017.docx)

<sup>11</sup>[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/555607/2015\\_Strategic\\_Defence\\_and\\_Security\\_Review.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>



## METHOD

The purpose and nature of the documents were evaluated using the following four categories:

1. level of complexity (whether the document includes all aspects of the national defence system or is limited to the Department of Defence and armed forces);
2. quality of the end state definition (whether the document sets out clear objectives and if so, whether they are in accordance with the SMART method);
3. proactivity/reactivity (the focus of the document on addressing current problems or rather future needs);
4. level of elaboration of the objectives (whether the document according to the set-out objectives has the nature of a plan, concept, strategy or vision, i.e. whether it is of a general nature or rather specific).

The content analysis of the documents was carried out by means of 11 types of areas with binary evaluation (value of 1 if the area is reflected in the document; value of 2 if it is not reflected). The types of areas are based on the LTP structure and include:

- Definition of threats;
- Strategic principles;
- Expected use of the armed forces;
- Principles of the armed forces development;
- Capabilities structure of the armed forces;
- Requirements for the capabilities of the armed forces;
- Financial resources;
- Personnel resources;
- Material resources;
- Defence industry;
- Other components of the system of the state defence.

## NATURE OF THE DOCUMENTS

The results of the analysis of the documents' purpose and nature are shown in Annexe 2. A total of six to seven documents are closer to the values of 'Proactive' and 'Specific' and have the character of a 'Concept'. Conversely, only four documents - including LTP - can be described as 'Proactive' and 'General' and have the character of a 'Strategy'. The remaining two documents (Belgium and Austria) cannot be assigned to any of the categories.

The following documents are closest to the LTP:

- White Paper on Defence and National Security (France);
- White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Germany);
- Canada's Defence Policy.

These three documents occupy a position close to the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic in the hierarchy of strategic documents in the respective countries. Based on

the comparison it is seen as appropriate to shift the position of the future LTP to the areas of 'Proactive' and 'Specific' in combination with the character of the 'Concept' and to draw inspiration for preparing its contents particularly from the documents: *Defence Agreement 2018-2023* (Denmark), *In the Interest of the Netherlands, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, Long-Term Defence Development Plan with Emphasis on Building and Developing the SVK Armed Forces with an Outlook to 2030*, *National Defense Strategy* (US), and *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015* (UK).

If the future LTP should maintain the same nature as the current one, the inspiration should be drawn from *the White Paper on Defence and National Security* (France), *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Germany), and *Canada's Defence Policy*. In this case, it is desirable to specify more precisely the purpose, content and position of the LTP in the hierarchy of strategic documents of the Czech Republic (a departmental development strategy with its contents close to the White Paper on Defence elaborating in detail the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic).

<b>STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENTS</b>
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The typical structure of the documents is described in Table 1. All documents (100%) include passages dedicated to "definition of threats", "strategic principles", "requirements for the capabilities" and "capabilities structure". Most of the documents included the "principles of armed forces development" (82% of the documents), "expected use of the armed forces" (64% of the documents) and, depending on the type, also "resources" (financial - 100%, personnel - 91%, material - 82%). The less often mentioned categories include "other components of the system of the state defence" (represented in 55% of the documents) and "defence industry" (represented in 45% of the documents).

**Table 1 - Structure of analysed documents**

Definition of threats	100%
Strategic principles	100%
Requirements for capabilities	100%
Capabilities structure	100%
Resources (Financial / Personnel / Material)	100% / 91% / 82%
Principles of development	82%
Operations	64%
Other components of the state defence system	55%
Defence industry	45%

It appears desirable to include the following chapters in the LTP 2035: Definition of threats, Strategic principles, Requirements for development, Capabilities Structure, and Financial resources. It is also possible to recommend the inclusion of Principles of development, Personnel resources, Material resources and Operations. Based on the comparison, it is necessary to consider whether it is useful to include the less frequent chapters Other components of the system of the state defence and the Defence Industry.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
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Particular attention was paid to the security environment assessment - what threats are listed and which ones are absent, and where it was evident from the text, what is the trend that the country perceives with respect to the threat, i.e. whether the threat is increasing or is likely to increase or decrease within a set horizon).

The analysis made it possible to assess the differences in threat perception and to capture the change in the security environment over time (given the different date of publication of the documents). The different character of the documents significantly influenced the assessment. At the same time, a number of threats overlap and could not be clearly analytically separated - for example, hybrid threats could be attributed by a particular country to either the Russian Federation, non-state actors, cyberattacks or disinformation, etc.

The resulting matrix is a part of Annexe 3. There is a noticeable difference in the concept of analysed documents, where some documents provide an almost exhaustive list of threats, while others present the most current or increasing ones. The frequency of threats in documents (i.e. max. 11) or threats most often perceived as increasing or decreasing in importance was observed. The assessment results are summarized in Tables no. 2 and 3.

**Table- Frequency of threats**

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Number of countries</b>
instability outside Europe/North America	11
terrorism, radicalization	11
cyberattacks	11
power diffusion	9
non-state actors	9
illegal/massive migration	9
conflicts for raw materials and resources	9
proliferation of WMD and carriers	9
weak states	8
extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism	8
(international) organized crime	8
climate change, natural disasters	8
RF intervention in the East, assertive RF policy	7
disinformation, propaganda	7
possible use of WMD	7
globalization and increasing inequality	7

**Table 3 - Threats most often perceived as increasing**

Threat	Number of countries
power diffusion	7
Cyberattacks	6
non-state actors	5
globalization and increasing inequality	5
climate change	5
increase in defence spending by new powers/outside Europe	4
instability outside Europe/North America	4
conflicts for raw materials and resources	4
terrorism, radicalization	4
RF intervention in the East, assertive RF policy	4

### COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PERCEPTION WITH THE LTP 2030

The comparison of the security environment perception (Annexe 3) shows that the LTP does not differ significantly from the security environment perception of the studied countries and adequately reflects the main trends in the security environment. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some increasing threats that the LTP 2030, unlike a part of the foreign documents, does not reflect. These include, for example, the threat of aggression in outer space (listed in France, Germany, UK, Canada and the US documents) and climate change in the Arctic (Denmark, France, Canada, United Kingdom). France and Canada particularly emphasize the threat of attacks on their own citizens abroad (e.g. kidnappings) in their documents. It can be assumed that in the long term the relevance of these threats will also increase for the Czech Republic.

Most documents already explicitly deal with the Russian Federation as a threat, whether they mention intervention in Ukraine or just more generally the assertive policy of Russia. Some countries see the unpredictable development in foreign countries and the security policy of the RF as a threat. It is precisely this area, where there is a clear shift in the perception of the security environment. While documents issued up to 2014 indicate a decreasing threat of conventional armed conflict, documents published after 2014 no longer reflect such information. On the other hand, more than half of them newly accentuate the threat associated with Russia or the threat of disinformation or propaganda. This clearly demonstrates the transformation of perception of the security environment and the flexibility of response by the studied states in their strategic and conceptual documents.

The threat that the LTP does not accentuate is the use of weapons of mass destruction (especially tactical nuclear weapons) by countries that possess them – i.e. not only their proliferation. Some documents no longer focus on cyberattacks as the only threat, but also single out cyber espionage or cybercrime as separate threats.

### **C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UPDATING THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE**

Based on the performed analyses and taking into account developments in the security environment after 2014, it is possible to recommend the following modifications for the

updated text of the LTP, particularly in four areas: a) overall concept of the document (purpose), b) content, c) form and d) used terminology.

## CONCEPT (PURPOSE) OF THE DOCUMENT

Clarification of the concept of the document appears to be crucial in terms of whether it reflects a holistic approach to the defence of the state - and as such must address all the capabilities (not only military) necessary to ensure defence, or it only takes into account the defence sector, i.e. The Czech Armed Forces.

### Recommendations:

- To accommodate LTP in accordance with Minister's Order No. 66/2012<sup>13</sup>, whereas the document will serve as a departmental strategy providing a conceptual basis for formulating strategic objectives of I and II levels and guiding conceptual development of capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (especially the Czech Armed Forces). It is necessary to adapt the title, structure and content to the chosen concept.
- In the introduction of the LTP, specify its purpose and define its position in the hierarchy of strategic documents (the documents it is based on and the documents that develop it further or evaluate it).
- When updating the LTP, it is desirable to use the approved Methodological Guide for the Creation of Conceptual Documents (especially considering alternative views and possibilities of their verification).

## CONTENT RECOMMENDATIONS

### CHAPTER II PRINCIPLES

In the second chapter, when elaborating the principles of defence of the Czech Republic, it is necessary to:

verify if the documents and decisions expressing the Czech Government's approach to defence are up-to-date (or omit them altogether);

broaden the principles of the defence policy, in particular by reflecting on the following points:

conclusions of the NATO summits in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels;

development of the EU Strategic Autonomy (PESCO etc.);

erosion of the international security order.

incorporate a reaction to the modified political-military ambitions, the requirement to increase the number of Czech Armed Forces by 5,000 soldiers<sup>14</sup> and the requirements arising from Capability Targets 2017 - especially the creation of a heavy brigade by 2026.

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<sup>13</sup> Minister's Order No. 66/2012, Planning of activities and development implemented in defence sector, published in: Věstník MO.

<sup>14</sup> Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic 2017. Available at:

[http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id\\_40001\\_50000/46088/Obrann\\_strategie\\_2017\\_-\\_CZ.pdf](http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/Obrann_strategie_2017_-_CZ.pdf)

## CHAPTER III - EXPECTED SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The threats listed in the “Main Trends” section correspond with the assessment of the security environment in the analysed foreign documents. The recommendations are concerned with partial updates or emphasising of some points.

Given the changes in the security environment since the publishing of the LTP 2030, the following recommendations are desirable:

- Keep the **emphasis on reducing response time** in crises (in accordance with the Defence Strategy<sup>15</sup>), but do not specify the time period, given that reaction times vary depending on the operational domain and tools used - they can range from minutes to months.
- Consider the fact that the current rise in defence spending does not only concern the Russian Federation and non-European regions, but also Europe, including the Eastern European countries.
- On the trend of increasing energy demand, indicate that the demand for non-fossil energy sources will also increase.
- In addition to cyberattacks in the area of cyber threats, include the threat of information operations (reflected in the LTP 2030 only in the trend of continuing globalization through “misuse of media for the purposes of information war”). These operations take the form of disinformation, *fake news* and propaganda and may target armed forces, defence policy or influence public opinion or political decision-making on defence and armed forces issues.
- Emphasize the complexity and interconnectedness of these threats (e.g. migration is a complex of security, economic, environmental and other factors).
- Consider opportunities for securing defence and developing the capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces (multinational cooperation, technology...).

Interconnect thus defined security environment with the implications for defence and the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

In the section defining the capabilities and factors that will be required by the *nature of the future security environment*, it is also appropriate to add the following recommendations:

- strengthen the individual capacity to resist armed attack in accordance with Article III of the Washington Treaty for the necessary period;
- strengthen strategic communications capability;
- strengthen the resilience and crisis preparedness of the whole of society.

Depending on the decision on the concept of LTP 2035 to include new chapters.

Following the political-military ambitions and assessment of the security environment, to complement the potential spectrum of tasks of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The proposal is listed in Annexe 1.

Complement the structured assessment of military implications with consequences relating to ensuring the defence of the state (way of conducting operations, lethality, conduct operations in full spectrum operations, the operational environment, etc.).

Include institutional adaptation considering intentions in the areas of economic management, human resources management, armaments and asset management. It is a

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id\\_40001\\_50000/46088/OS.pdf](http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/OS.pdf)

public document and it is important to strengthen the credibility in a transparent, purposeful, cost-effective and efficient functioning of the defence sector.

## **CHAPTER VI - PREREQUISITES FOR ACHIEVING THE NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITIES**

In the passage “Defence Budget and Budget Outlook”, do not give absolute figures, but rather communicate a certain trend (what is the target and in what time horizon does the Czech Republic plan to achieve it) and what structure the expenditures should have. At the same time, it is appropriate to continue to reflect the recommendations and commitments to NATO and the EU (keeping the specific figure of 2% of GDP and the structure of expenditure).

Pay more attention to the issue of demographic development in the Czech Republic in the subchapter “Personnel Development”. Put more emphasis on innovative marketing, recruiting of hitherto neglected cohorts (women, foreigners, perpetrators of less serious crime) and factoring into account the demographic estimation (personnel demands) in acquisition plans (the so-called third offset). Attention should also be paid to the need to improve the education and training of citizens for state defence and crisis situations, preferably with the aim of systematic general education of citizens in the field of defence.

### **Perspectives of recruiting to armed forces abroad**

As a means of comparison, special attention was paid to coping with negative demographic trends and difficult recruitment to the armed forces. No country has stated its intention to change the armed forces' recruitment system currently in use, whether it is a conscription system (Austria, Denmark) or a professional army (other countries). However, increased emphasis is placed on strengthening the armed forces through an active reserve system. Their advantage is that they allow access to the expertise and capabilities of citizens (e.g. in the field of cyber defence) and improve the image of armed forces in society. In accordance with foreign documents (Britain, Canada, USA, Austria, Germany or Poland), when it comes to the updated LTP, it is possible to proclaim the need to increase the share of women in the armed forces, including strengthening their role within combat units.

We recommend that the subchapter “Defence Industry and Research” should be conceived more generally, given that the issue of the relationship between defence and industry is addressed in a separate and specialized document (Armaments and Defence Industry Development Support Strategy<sup>16</sup>). Also include expectations of what industry can and should do for defence and how it will promote state interest (including research, experimental development) and innovation driven from the top-level downward, i.e. in accordance with the needs of the state).

## **FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

Improve in particular the graphic design of the LTP. Compared to LTP, foreign documents provide a high level of content visualization, which increases the clarity and

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<sup>16</sup> [http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id\\_40001\\_50000/46088/strategie-vyzbrojovani-do-2025.pdf](http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/id_40001_50000/46088/strategie-vyzbrojovani-do-2025.pdf)

attractiveness of the document for the wider public. The inspiration can be drawn especially from the Defence White Paper of the Netherlands<sup>17</sup>.

Balance the details of the reported data. On one hand, LTP uses a rather vague wording (for example “all forces in case of ambition”) and on the other hand, it provides very detailed data such as the number of soldiers, range in km or the number of aircraft. The LTP should distinguish between political and military responsibility and leave room for further military elaboration. The formulations used should be brought into line with the Act No. 222/1999 Coll. and Act No.110/1998 Coll. and with the strategic documents (e.g. include the obligations of legal entities).

## TERMINOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Use unified and consistent terminology. Proposed changes are attached in the following table.

**Table 4 - Recommendations for the used terminology**

Existing concept	Proposed concept	Justification
The Long Term Perspective for Defence	The Long Term Perspective for the Defence Resort	Apart from the defence industry, the document addresses only internal defence issues
Military threats	External threats	Act No. 219 and Act No. 220/1999 Coll.
Polar region <sup>18</sup>	Arctic region	The text refers to climatic, not geographical conditions
Military capabilities	Capabilities	Need for military and non-military capabilities, not just military capabilities, also linked to Capability Targets of 2017
Definition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (page 8) with MOPR and the Castle Guard <sup>19</sup>	Czech Armed Forces, Military Police and Military Intelligence <sup>20</sup>	Different terms in the document on pages 8 and 13, where it states “Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and Military Intelligence”
Operations under Article 5	Collective defence operations	In 2035 there may be a completely different contract with another article, the essence is the collective defence
Fire support	Active action /engagement?	The term in NATO documents also highlights the need for non-lethal engagement

<sup>17</sup> <https://english.defensie.nl/binaries/defence/documents/policy-notes/2018/03/26/defence-white-paper/Defence+White+Paper+2018.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> Translator’s note: The English translation of the LTP does not actually use the word “Polar”, the Czech word “polární” is translated as “Arctic”

<sup>19</sup> MOPR= Military Office of the President of the Czech Republic

<sup>20</sup> AČR = Czech Armed Forces, VP = Military Police, VZ = Military Intelligence



Warfare in urban areas	Engagement? in urban areas	Not only the fight is influenced by this environment
Key capabilities	Main Capability Areas	Compliance with NATO documents

## D. STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2035

An alternative approach, scenario method and strategic benchmarking were used to define the future direction of the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the horizon of LTP 2035.

### METHOD

**Strategic benchmarking.** Alternative approaches to the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the LTP 2035 horizon were formed on the basis of an analysis of the current and intended form of the armed forces of selected countries. Based on the expert assessment, 18 qualitative and quantitative criteria were set for the strategic assessment of the armed forces, with each criterion assuming five values (table below on p. 16). Based on these criteria, each country was evaluated on the scale of 1-5. The evaluation was carried out on two levels: the current state of the armed forces (what have they achieved so far) - and the future state of the armed forces (what capabilities does the country plan to achieve in the long term according to the analysed document). The aim was to capture trends in the development of the armed forces of selected countries and compare them with the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and the three strategic alternatives created for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

**Strategic planning assumptions.** Based on the strategic analyses<sup>21</sup> it was possible to establish 7 strategic planning assumptions which are not likely to deviate significantly from the current situation in the long term. They represent **certainties** in the scenarios creation.

These are the following assumptions:

- security threats and trends in their development **aggravate the conditions** under which the security interests of the Czech Republic and its allies (dangerous and competing world) will be promoted; sustained societal demand for credible capabilities;
- **weakening** of the influence and power of the West (the diffusion of power, the multipolar world, the response to world developments outweighs the possibilities of influencing its development);

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<sup>21</sup> CBVSS Strategic Analysis: Security Environment 2017; Operating environment 2017; Technological development 2017. Available at: <http://www.unob.cz/cbvss/Stranky/publikace.aspx>.

- **global security mechanisms** offer only **limited assurances** of security (continuing rivalry of powers, lack of political will to jointly resolve security problems and conflicts);
- low probability of direct military confrontation between powers;
- high **vulnerability of the developed** and **open world** (dependence on networks, information, communication and free movement of people, capital and goods);
- **economic cycle** associated with pressure on public finances;
- demographics of an **ageing world** with consequences for replenishment of the armed forces.

**Driving forces.** To create alternative scenarios, 4 driving forces were identified using the PESTLE method. In the scenarios, these are **uncertainties** for which possible extreme values have been defined by an expert estimate. These are the following forces:

Driving force	Opportunity	Risk
Political priorities and the importance of defence policy in the political agenda	Defence policy is one of the government's priorities - emphasis on meeting international commitments, financial stability, long-term planning	Defence policy is marginalized in terms of political interest - international commitments and plans are not consistently implemented, spending restraints
Allies' political will to fulfil collective defence obligations ("tolerance of free-riding")	Common values, coherence, credible deterrence and readiness for action, low risks associated with the country's defence capabilities	Reducing credible deterrence and capacity for action, increasing the risks associated with the country's defence capability
Level of international cooperation and solidarity of the transatlantic community	Solidarity, joint capability / technology development projects, specialization	National solutions, isolationism, stagnation in capability development
Technological development	Capabilities development, creating technological dominance	Proliferation, empowering the adversary

**Table 5 - Criteria for evaluating capabilities of the armed forces**

CRITERION	1	2	3	4	5
MODEL (CONSCRIPTION PROFESSIONAL)	General conscription (type: Austria) - general and broad conscription	Militia (type: Switzerland) - small professional core widely supplemented by militia (national guard) - highly prepared reserves	Selective conscription (type: Sweden) - large professional core is selectively complemented by conscripts	Professional (type: Czech Republic) - complete dominance of professionals, small and voluntary reserves, there is a conscription duty	Fully professional (type: USA) - complete dominance of professionals, voluntary reserves, no conscription duty
NATURE OF THE STRUCTURE (BALANCED SPECIALIZED)	Exclusive emphasis on balanced armed forces structure and capabilities	Strong emphasis on balanced structure and capabilities, acceptance of partial (selective) specialization of the armed forces	Unclear, cannot be assessed	Tendency to specialize and abandon balanced armed forces structure and capabilities	Exclusive emphasis on (national) armed forces specialization
NATURE OF THE CAPABILITIES (TERRITORIAL-EXPEDITIONARY)	Armed forces exclusively built to defend their own territory	Armed forces exclusively built to defend their own and allied territory	Armed forces built both to defend their own or allied territory, as well as for deployment abroad	Armed forces built mostly as expeditionary - only a limited capability of independent territorial defence	Armed forces built as exclusively expeditionary - defence of its own territory fully replaced by the defence of interests abroad
SIZE (REDUCTION GROWTH)	Significant reduction of armed forces (more than 10%)	Reduction of armed forces (up to 10%)	Stable, unchanging numbers	Growth of armed forces (up to 10%)	Significant growth of armed forces (over 10%)

INNOVATION (HI-TECH STAGNATION)	Conceptual innovation (new generational concepts, approaches, forms - dictates direction)	Rather conceptual innovation	Technological innovation (new technologies but the same concept)	Rather technical innovation with a partial replacement of technology	Technical innovation (modernization of existing technology)
ADVERSARY STATE (COMPARABLE) - NON-STATE (ASSYMETRICAL)	Primarily prepares for a conflict with another state actor and its regular armed forces	Predominant preparation for a conflict with a state actor (foreign regular armed forces), partial preparation for a conflict with a non-state actor	Prepares for both types of adversaries	Predominant preparation for a conflict with a non-state actor, only partial preparation for a conflict with a state actor	Dominantly prepares for a conflict with a non-state actor (terrorism, guerrilla)
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE (SECURED WEAKENED)	Total dependence on NATO	Predominant dependence on NATO, limited autonomous capabilities	Balanced level of autonomy and dependence	Predominant autonomous capability of military action, only partial dependence on NATO	Independence from NATO - full autonomous military capability
SECURITY (INTERNAL EXTERNAL)	The long-term fundamental (primary) role of armed forces in ensuring internal security of the state	Increasing role of armed forces in ensuring internal security of the state	Assistant (secondary) role of armed forces in ensuring internal security of the state	Negligible and declining role of armed forces in ensuring internal security of the state	No role of armed forces in ensuring internal state security
DEFENCE SPENDING (INCREASING DECREASING)	Real expenses are min. 2% of GDP for defence spending	Real expenses do not reach 2%, but a commitment to reaching this level is declared	Declared increase in defence spending but less than 2% of GDP	Declared to keep the defence spending at a constant level and below 2% of GDP	Refusing to spend the min. 2 % of GDP on defence spending, a decrease in spending, or not addressed

SPENDING STRUCTURE (PRO INVESTMENT - DEGRADING)	Real investment expenses are 20% of the spending	Real investment expenses do not reach 20% of the spending, but there is a progress in reaching this share	Declared increase in investment, but does not reach 20% of the spending	Declared to maintain investments at current levels and below 20%	In the long term, 20% is not expected, a decrease in investment spending, or not addressed
LAND FORCES (HEAVY - LIGHT)	Great (dominant) emphasis on heavy land forces	Greater emphasis on heavy land forces	Balanced land forces	Greater emphasis on light land forces	Great (dominant) emphasis on light land forces
ENGAGEMENT IN THE LAND DIMENSION	Significantly increasing importance	Slightly increasing importance	No change, not specified, not relevant	Slightly decreasing importance	Significantly decreasing importance
ENGAGEMENT IN THE AIR DIMENSION	Significantly increasing importance	Slightly increasing importance	No change, not specified, not relevant	Slightly decreasing importance	Significantly decreasing importance
ENGAGEMENT IN THE MARITIME DIMENSION	Significantly increasing importance	Slightly increasing importance	No change, not specified, not relevant	Slightly decreasing importance	Significantly decreasing importance
ENGAGEMENT IN THE OUTER SPACE DIMENSION	Significantly increasing importance	Slightly increasing importance	No change, not specified, not relevant	Slightly decreasing importance	Significantly decreasing importance
ENGAGEMENT IN THE CYBERSPACE DIMENSION	Significantly increasing importance	Slightly increasing importance	No change, not specified, not relevant	Slightly decreasing importance	Significantly decreasing importance
NATURE AND OF PROJECTION CAPABILITIES	Tactical level	Tactical-operational level	Operational level	Operational-strategic level	Strategic level

(TACTICAL STRATEGIC)	-					
CLIMATIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS (GLOBAL - REGIONAL)	No restrictions	climate	With the exception of the Arctic climate	With the exception of tropical climate	With the exception of subtropical climate	Only the domestic climate of the assessed country

## EVALUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

The results of the analysis of the armed forces development abroad are shown below in Table 6 and spatially visualized in Chart 1. They illustrate the current and future state and direction of the development of the armed forces' capabilities. A comparison of individual countries with the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic is given in Annexe 4. The analysis was performed according to the criteria (Table 5 above). Calculation of the most frequently occurring value (mode) was used - it corresponds to the most frequently represented armed forces property/capability.

A shift in the individual criteria from the present to the future desired state:

- There is a distinct **tendency to gradually increase the percentage of armed forces personnel** (up to 10% overall). This applies to countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, but also the neighbouring Poland and Slovakia. The USA and Great Britain also plan to implement this increase.
- Even though the preparation for a conflict with a state actor has been the primary focus so far, the current trend is to **prepare the armed forces for adversaries of both state and non-state character**. This reflects the aforementioned trends in the security environment, where according to sample data, non-state actors are among the threats most commonly perceived as increasing.
- In addition to ensuring security interests, there has been a slight **increase in the need to strengthen the emphasis on heavy land forces at the expense of the light**. This requirement was declared by Denmark or Canada. The Armed Forces of France and Germany ascribe the dominant role entirely to the heavy land forces.
- In most countries, the importance of armed forces in the airspace and cyberspace is slightly increasing.
- There is also an ambition to maintain or **achieve the capability to operate globally** in the long term, without any climatic and geographical constraints.
- The most noticeable is the countries' **determination to increase their defence spending** so that their ambitions for the development of armed forces can be fulfilled. In many partner countries, defence spending has long stagnated and was well below 2% of GDP. The analysed documents confirm the commitment to **move towards spending 2% of GDP**. Belgium and Austria do not explicitly express this interest. It is unlikely that Germany will increase its defence spending to 2% of GDP.
- Countries are planning to **achieve spending of 20% on investments**, while the current situation has been characterized only by a gradual increase in this share.
- The vast majority of countries plan to **improve the technological level** of the armed forces' technology and equipment used.

The evaluation of the current condition of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in most criteria corresponds to the Armed Forces of Poland, Germany and Denmark. All countries correspond in particular in the basic setting of forces (a professional army with a strong emphasis on a balanced structure and capabilities within the current sub-specialization) and the importance given to individual operational dimensions. The biggest difference in this sample lies in the nature and projection of capabilities, where the Czech Republic is currently lagging behind.

The future state of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (at the same time corresponds to the alternative state 2) most closely resembles the future state of forces in the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. Compared to the basic parameters, they overlap the most with the Belgian Armed Forces. Both future armies are expected to be professional and reinforced by reserves, both will maintain an emphasis on the balanced capability structure and will be constructed as to be deployed to defend their own and allied territories as well as for deployment abroad, with capability projection at an operational level. In both cases, an increase in numbers of armed forces personnel is planned. The armed forces of both countries should play a greater role in ensuring the internal security of the state in the future. It should be noted that Belgium's current condition is closer to the planned development and in some respects (e.g. projection of capabilities) their capabilities are already fully developed.

If the future expected state of the Czech Republic is achieved, the country will approximate to the state of the Dutch Armed Forces. The Netherlands is also planning to increase its force numbers. However, even more so than in the case of Belgium, the Netherlands already has the capabilities that the Czech Republic would have in the future. This applies to the projection of capabilities at an operational level, the uniform nature of land forces in terms of light and heavy forces ratio, and symmetrical development of the capabilities of the armed forces for deployment with the goal of territorial defence in foreign operations.

Denmark and the Czech Republic both have the same ambition to increase the size of the armed forces, spending and share of investments. The air and land dimensions should become more prominent in the development of both countries' capabilities, and there should also be a significant increase in the capability to operate in the cyberspace. The armed forces will be able to operate at an operational level (already achieved in Denmark). At the same time, the role of forces in ensuring internal security will be strengthened.




Table 6 - Evaluation of the capabilities of the armed forces abroad (current state × outlook for the future)

State / Army		Professional - Conscription	Balanced - Specialized	Territorial - Expeditionary	Small - Large	Innovation	Adversary	Collective defence	Internal security	Defence spending	Investments	Land forces	Land dimension of engagement	Air dimension of engagement	Maritime dimension of action	Space dimension of engagement	Cyberspace	Capabilities character and projection	Climatic and geographical constraints
Czech Republic	Existing condition	4	2	4	2	5	4	1	3	5	3	5	2	3	3	3	3	1	2
	Future state	4	2	3	4	4	3	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	3	2
Belgium	Existing condition	4	2	3	3	4	3	2	3	5	4	3	4	2	2	3	3	3	2
	Future state	4	2	3	4	3	3	2	2	5	3	3	4	1	1	3	2	3	1
Denmark	Existing condition	4	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	1
	Future state	2	2	3	4	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	3	1
France	Existing condition	4	1	3	3	2	3	5	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	5	1
	Future state	4	1	3	3	1	3	5	2	2	1	1	3	2	3	2	2	5	1
Germany	Existing condition	4	1	3	4	5	4	3	5	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	4	2
	Future state	4	1	3	4	5	3	3	4	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	4	2
Netherlands	Existing condition	4	2	3	3	4	2	3	3	4	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	2
	Future state	4	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	2
Poland	Existing condition	4	2	3	3	4	2	2	3	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2
	Future state	3	2	3	4	4	2	2	3	1	1	2	1	3	3	3	2	3	2
Austria	Existing condition	1	3	1	3	3	1	5	1	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	5
	Future state	1	3	1	2	4	2	5	1	5	4	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	5
Slovakia	Existing condition	4	1	2	3	4	2	2	2	4	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2
	Future state	4	1	2	4	2	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2
USA	Existing condition	4	1	3	3	2	3	5	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	5	1
	Future state	4	1	3	4	1	2	5	3	1	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	5	1
Great Britain	Existing condition	4	2	4	3	4	2	4	3	2	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	1
	Future state	4	2	4	4	3	3	4	3	2	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	4	1
Canada	Existing condition	3	1	3	3	4	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	2	3	3	3	1
	Future state	3	1	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	4	1
Mode	Existing condition	4	2	3	3	4	2	2	3	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Mode	Future state	4	2	3	4	3	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	1
Mean	Existing condition	3,67	1,67	2,92	3	3,67	2,58	3,17	2,83	3,33	2,33	2,83	2,75	2,75	2,67	3	2,83	3,08	1,83

Mean	Future state	3,42	1,67	2,83	3,58	2,83	2,75	3,17	2,5	2,58	1,75	2,25	2,33	2	2,33	2,58	1,67	3,42	1,75
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Graph 1 - Visualization of the development of armed forces capabilities abroad (mode) and in the Czech Republic



## STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Based on the analyses and expert assessments, the following strategic alternatives for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic were formed:

1. SHARED FORCES FOR A COOPERATING WORLD (PINK SCENARIO);
2. COOPERATING FORCES FOR A CONTEMPORARY WORLD (PRAGMATIC SCENARIO);
3. SOVEREIGN FORCES FOR A FRAGMENTED WORLD (BLACK SCENARIO).

Strategic alternatives for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic no. 1 and 3 describe extreme and less likely models of the development of the Czech Republic's defence policy and the Armed Forces based on the pink and black scenarios. Both models define a wide scope for innumerable alternatives that can oscillate around the most likely cooperative model of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic for the present world. The degree of oscillation and the resulting state of armed forces will be determined by the prevailing influences of driving forces and strategic choices.

Table 7 (on page 26) enumerates the characteristics and capabilities of the armed forces according to individual scenarios. It uses 18 criteria developed for strategic benchmarking.

### ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1: SHARED FORCES FOR A COOPERATING WORLD

**Driving forces development:** Solidarity, responsibility and the political will of the allies to fulfil collective defence obligations prevail. EU strategic autonomy is a complementary element of a strong transatlantic link. International military and military-industrial cooperation in defence provision and capability development is deepened. The political leadership of the EU countries delegate their competence in defence or its significant part to higher transnational level. Science results are shared, synergy in the use of available resources prevails as well as solidarity in eliminating the risks associated with demographic development and economic cycles.

**Impact on the state of the armed forces:** The armed forces will primarily be an instrument of common European defence policy and collective defence of the transatlantic community. The country's defence capability still largely depends on the Alliance while deepening cooperation and autonomy between the EU and the European pillar of NATO. The model of professional, numerically smaller, multinational and strongly interconnected forces with specialized, highly modern and interoperable capabilities will be maintained. The Czech Republic will contribute to a wide range of jointly created and shared capabilities (multinational command elements, strategic capabilities, rapid response forces, support elements, advanced ammunition supplies and necessary supplies, education and training facilities, critical infrastructure elements).

The balanced forces model will be abandoned. Emphasis will be put on quality, responsiveness, sustainability and interoperability across a full spectrum of global operations. Expeditionary capabilities of the armed forces and light land forces will be developed the most. While the importance of the air and outer space dimensions will decrease due to the development of the capabilities of the Armed forces in the Czech

Republic, the importance of cyberspace will increase. The armed forces will continue to be ready to assist in ensuring the country's internal security.

Specializing of forces will free resources to improve their technological maturity (autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, managed information). Synergies resulting from a higher degree of cooperation will make defence spending more efficient, keeping it below 2% of GDP. The role of the common defence industrial base and the single market for defence technologies will be strengthened. National protectionism will be reduced.

## **ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2: COOPERATING FORCES FOR THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD**

**Driving forces development:** Defence is the sole responsibility of the state. The emphasis is on sovereignty and the tendency to apply national solutions in defence provision and forces development. There are different views among allies on how to solve security problems and how to fulfil collective defence commitments. At the same time, there is uncertainty in the relations of the transatlantic community which is consequently undermining its coherence. However, mutual values continue to be recognized and solidarity prevails among allies. Due to pressure from the US, NATO's European pillar strengthens its capabilities, but the gap between the US and Europe continues to widen. International military and military-industrial cooperation in defence provision and capability development is incoherent and takes on different formats. Science cooperation carries on, the required synergies in the use of available resources are not achieved and there is limited political support for the development of jointly created and shared capabilities.

**Impact on the state of the armed forces:** Defence provision is based on a strong transatlantic link and deterrent potential (conventional and nuclear), and collective defence capability pursuant to Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance has no credible alternative. The potential development of a collective defence mechanism allows for a reduction in reaction time. It is possible that for a short period of time, the Czech Republic will have to ensure the defence of its territory and airspace using only its own forces. The Czech Republic declares its commitment to participate in ensuring international security and strengthening stability in the world, as reflected in active participation in international missions and operations (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE).

Professional armed forces rely on a numerically limited reserves and at the same time strengthen some specialized capabilities. The forces are formed primarily to defend their own territory and to defend the territory of the allies. Nature of the capabilities meets the needs of limited global action. The capability to provide host nation support to allied forces (HNS) is growing in importance. Combat capabilities used in a conflict with non-state actors (light and expeditionary) as well as with regular armed forces with similar potential (heavy forces with high firepower and protection) are being developed. Emphasis is placed on the contribution of armed forces to ensure internal security.

Armed forces strive to maintain a balanced set of capabilities with a focus on land-centric forces and their comprehensive support. The structure of forces and capabilities responds to new challenges in cyberspace. Strategic capabilities are shared or available on a contractual basis. A wide portfolio of capabilities (versatility) is maintained for the full spectrum of operations without geographical limitations (with the exception of the Arctic climate). The aim is to strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces (command system,

supplies, and materials) and the number of soldiers so they are ready for action at the operational level using mobilization. Creating balanced forces reduces their overall technological level and their interoperability with the allies.

The modernization of armed forces entails the use of its own defence industry and ensuring security of supply in the event of a crisis. Opportunities arising from technological development are used only to a limited extent (autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, new materials). The modernization of the technology can thus be characterized as a technological innovation with only a partial generational change of technology. The share of investment in defence spending is gradually moving towards 20% of the budget. International cooperation in the development of capabilities and their sharing is increasingly important, but its full potential is limited by national interests and protectionism.

The Czech Republic maintains its sovereignty in deciding on the armed forces development and use. The country spends 2% of GDP on defence. It contributes equitably to all forms of the burden-sharing of collective defence (capability development objectives, participation in the command structure, development of common capabilities, emergency forces/units?, operations, training).

### **ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 3: SOVEREIGN FORCES FOR A FRAGMENTED WORLD**

**Driving forces development:** In a fragmented world, the allies' will to meet collective defence obligations is reduced. The capacity for action of the transatlantic link and the deterrent role of the Alliance are weakened. The level of integration of the EU's common defence and security policy and the military capabilities of EU countries do not provide the necessary security guarantees. The EU has only a limited level of strategic autonomy.

**Impact on the state of the armed forces:** The country is still partly dependent on the Alliance. There is a growing demand for independency in defending the country which focuses on adversaries of state and non-state nature. It is necessary to significantly increase the numbers of armed forces and develop the full spectrum of capabilities. The structure of forces and modernization takes into account exclusively territorial defence with regional engagement?. Heavy land forces, in particular, are reinforced. At the same time, there is a growing need to develop capabilities for engagement in the air dimension and cyberspace. Replenishment of professional forces can only be achieved with compulsory reserves and partial or full conscription.

An increase in defence spending above 2% of GDP is necessary. The attitude to the defence industry is characterized by protectionism. There is only a low level of international cooperation in capabilities development. Technology innovation is significantly reduced. National decision-making autonomy in defence matters is redeemed by a higher degree of risk in ensuring the defence of the state.

**Table 7 - Capabilities and tasks of the armed forces according to strategic alternatives of development**

CRITERION	CURRENT STATE				ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1: "SHARED"				ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2: "COOPERATIVE"				ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 3: "SOVEREIGN"			
MODEL (CONSCRIPTION - PROFESSIONAL)			X				X				X		X			
NATURE OF THE STRUCTURE (BALANCED - SPECIALIZED)	X							X	X				X			
NATURE OF THE CAPABILITIES (TERRITORIAL- EXPEDITIONARY)			X				X			X			X			
SIZE (REDUCTION - GROWTH)	X			X	X							X				X
INNOVATION (HI-TECH - STAGNATION)			X	X							X				X	
ADVERSARY (STATE/COMPARABLE - NON-STATE/ASSYMETRICAL)			X			X				X				X		
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE (SECURED - WEAKENED)	X				X				X						X	
SECURITY (INTERNAL - EXTERNAL)		X			X				X							X
DEFENCE SPENDING (INCREASING - DECREASING)			X					X	X				X			
SPENDING STRUCTURE (PRO INVESTMENT - DEGRADING)		X		X					X					X		
LAND FORCES (HEAVY - LIGHT)			X				X			X			X			
ENGAGEMENT IN THE LAND DIMENSION	X						X		X				X			
ENGAGEMENT IN THE AIR DIMENSION		X						X	X				X			
ENGAGEMENT IN THE MARITIME DIMENSION		X				X				X				X		
ENGAGEMENT IN THE OUTER SPACE DIMENSION		X						X	X					X		
ENGAGEMENT IN THE CYBERSPACE		X			X				X				X			
CAPABILITIES NATURE AND PROJECTION OF (TACTICAL - STRATEGIC)	X				X					X					X	
CLIMATIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTIONS	X				X				X							X

## EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

The evaluation of strategic alternatives for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic was carried out according to the following criteria: (1) Level of risk for ensuring the defence of the state; (2) Nature of the forces; (3) Model of the forces; (4) Capabilities/Technology; (5) Size of the forces; (6) Defence spending; (7) Modernization; (8) Industry; (9) Decision-making autonomy.

The evaluation reveals the differences between the individual strategic alternatives for the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The highest value for ensuring the defence of the state in relation to costs is provided by forces whose parameters will be gradually adapted to the model “Armed Forces of the Czech Republic 1”. However, in the LTP 2035 horizon, it is unlikely that this model will be achieved. A limiting factor is the pace of gradual strengthening of the EU's strategic autonomy as a complementary element of NATO's capacity for action. The model of sovereign forces provides the country with the lowest guarantees and highest defence costs, but the forces will not be able to benefit sufficiently from effective international cooperation. The “Armed Forces of the Czech Republic 3” model is a high-risk variant in terms of ensuring the defence of the state.

Recommendations: The Czech Republic should direct the state's defence policy and long-term development of armed forces towards the cooperative model of armed forces. This allows a reasonable balance of capabilities, specialization of forces and strengthening of the quality (technological and personnel). The core of such armed forces will be comprehensively supported land-centric forces with a high level of readiness for action and versatility with the possibility of their reinforcement (mobilization and allied forces).



**Table 8 - Evaluation of the strategic alternatives of development of the Czech Armed Forces (contributions x weaknesses)**

	STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC NO. 1: „SHARED“	STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC NO. 2: „COOPERATIVE“	STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC NO. 3: „SOVEREIGN“
Level of risk for ensuring the defence of the state	Low level of risk	Low/medium level of risk	Medium / high level of risk
Nature of the forces	Global	Global /Regional	Regional / Territorial
Model of the forces	Supranational, Voluntary	Voluntary	Mixed
Capabilities / Technology	Shared, Specialization / Innovation	Balanced / Modernization	Full spectrum / Stagnation
Size of the forces (share of soldiers in the population)	Less than 4/1000	4/1000	More than 4/1000
Defence spending	Less than 2 % GDP	2 % GDP	More than 2%
Industry	Common European	Cooperative national	Cooperative national
Decision-making autonomy	Supranational	National	National

## STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Based on the analyses and considering the wider context associated with the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, it is clear that the Czech Republic will have to make several fundamental strategic choices when formulating the defence policy and the direction of the development of the Armed Forces.

These include:

- Meeting the fair collective defence commitment in defence spending;
- Leaving the balanced forces model, i.e. strengthening quality at the expense of quantity, specialization and a higher level of international cooperation;
- Prioritization of modernization of land-centric, air and special forces;
- Rethinking the current recruitment model.

The decision-making will be influenced by the development of driving forces and their consequences for ensuring the defence of the state. It is desirable for the Czech Republic to strengthen the armed forces model leading towards strategic option 2.



## **POTENTIAL SPECTRUM OF TASKS WHEN SECURING THE DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

(Proposal of chapter content)

1. DEFENSE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND ALLIES WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM, DETERRENCE OF POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
  - defence of own territory (Art. 3 of the Washington Treaty before activation of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, reserves, supplies, industry, mobilization, operational preparation of the state territory, HNS, population preparation) and implementation of credible deterrence measures (preparedness, readiness);
  - defence of the allies' territory (Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, LoA);
  - defence against terrorist threats and hybrid actions (resilience, strategic communications);
  - strengthening defence capabilities within NATO and the EU (innovation, an interoperable single set of forces able to operate in the full spectrum of operations, high and very-high readiness response forces);
  - measures to support allies as a token of solidarity (air policing, eFP, force projection...).
  
2. ENSURING ADEQUATE MILITARY AND CIVIL-MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO STABILIZE THE FULL SPECTRUM OF THREATS AND CRISES WHILE AVERTING NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND ITS ALLIES
  - national participation in early recognition of crisis situation (reporting);
  - participation in conflict prevention and strengthening of stability (international organizations, alliances and partnerships)
  - participation in crisis management and subsequent stabilization and reconstruction;
  - participation in UN peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid;
  - participation in the fight against terrorism and cyber threats;
  - participation in the protection of maritime routes, enforcement of international embargoes and sanctions.
  
3. PROTECTION OF OWN TERRITORY, NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF AN INTEGRATED EMERGENCY SYSTEM, AND ASSISTANCE TO

## POLICE WHEN ENSURING SAFETY AND STRENGTHENING OF THE RESILIENCE OF THE SOCIETY


- carrying out tasks to protect the territory (protection of airspace, infrastructure);
- performing tasks when dealing with natural disasters and other large-scale crisis situations (consequences of technical malfunctions and failures);
- participation in protection against terrorism and the management of mass migration;
- rescue and evacuation of persons from crisis areas abroad, hostage release;
- carrying out other legal tasks (transport of constitutional officials, support of sport, performance of the state administration in specific areas of activity...).

### 4. PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION, MILITARY DIPLOMACY

- strengthening of security structures and regional organizations
- development of bilateral security and military relations (Germany, Poland);
- participation in activities reducing international tension in the world (disarmament control, promoting international regimes, strengthening trust between countries...);
- strengthening European integration (strategic autonomy);
- participation in capacity building of partners.

•

## Annexe 2 - Comparative analysis of documents of selected countries




Level of complexity - the size of the circle



- 1 (big) - includes all aspects of state defense
- 2 (intermediate) - partially addresses the issue of defense outside the MoD
- 3 (small) - addresses just MO or armed forces

The Quality of the Definition of the Target State



- 1 (green) - very well defined target state; objectives are SMART
- 2 (orange) - target state is defined vaguely; not according to SMART
- 3 (red) - target state is not clear, or is defined vaguely

S1 - Czech Republic - Long-term Perspective for Defence 2030  
 S2 - Belgium - Strategic Vision of Defence  
 S3 - Denmark - Defence Agreement 2018-2023  
 S4 - France - White paper on Defence and National Security  
 S5 - Germany - 2016 White Paper of Security Policy and the Future of BW  
 S6 - Netherlands - In the Interest of the Netherlands  
 S7 - Poland - Defence Conception of the Republic of Poland  
 S8 - Austria - Military-strategic Conception 2017  
 S9 - Slovakia - Long-term Plan for the Development of the Slovak Armed Forces until 2030  
 S10 - USA - National Defence Strategy  
 S11 - Great Britain - National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015  
 S12 - Canada - Canada's Defence Policy 2017

Horizontal axis	Vertical axis
1 to solve current problems	1 plan
2 to manage current problems	2 conception
3 to anticipate future needs	3 strategy
4 to create a future	4 vision
	5 mission

### Annexe 3 - Threat Matrix



Country	CZE	B	DK	F	CA	D	NL	PL	A	SK	USA	UK
Year of publication / Threat	2015	2016	2018	2013	2017	2016	2013	2017	2013	2016	2015	2015
<i>Power diffusion</i>	↑	•	x	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	•	↑
<i>Non-state actors challenging state sovereignty (hybrid warfare)</i>	↑	↑	x	•	•	↑	•	↑	•	•	•	↑
<i>Increase in defence spending outside the Allied territory</i>	↑	↑	x	↑	x	↑	x	↑	x	•	x	↑
<i>Instability outside the Allied territory</i>	↑	•	•	•	↑	↑	↑	•	•	↑	•	•
<i>Instability on the southern European periphery</i>	x	↑	•	•	x	•	x	•	x	•	•	•
<i>Weak states</i>	↑	•	x	•	•	•	•	↑	•	x	•	•
<i>Urbanization, demographic pressures (failing/failed cities)</i>	↑	x	x	x	•	•	x	↑	x	x	•	•
<i>Illegal/Mass migration</i>	•	•	•	x	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	x	↑
<i>Conflicts over resources</i>	↑	x	x	↑	•	↑	•	x	•	•	•	↑
<i>Threat of conventional armed conflict</i>	•	•	x	•	x	↑	x	•	x	x	x	•
<i>Russian interventionism/assertive politics</i>	x	↑	↑	•	•	↑	x	↑	x	↑	•	x
<i>Unpredictable development in Russia</i>	x	•	x	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	•
<i>Disinformation, propaganda</i>	↑	•	•	x	↑	↑	x	•	x	↑	•	x
<i>Terrorism, radicalization</i>	↑	•	•	↑	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	•	•
<i>Extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism</i>	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	x	•	x	↑	•	•
<i>Threat of WMD use</i>	x	•	x	•	•	X	x	•	x	•	x	•
<i>WMD Proliferation</i>	↑	•	x	↑	↑	•	•	x	•	•	•	•
<i>Arms proliferation</i>	↑	x	x	•	•	X	•	x	x	•	•	↑
<i>(International) organized crime</i>	↑	•	x	•	•	•	x	x	•	•	•	•
<i>Piracy</i>	x	•	x	↑	x	•	x	x	•	x	x	x
<i>Cyber attacks</i>	•	•	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	•	•	•	•	↑
<i>Cyber espionage</i>	x	x	•	↑	↑	•	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>Cyber crime</i>	x	x	•	↑	x	•	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>State aggression in space</i>	x	x	x	↑	•	•	x	x	x	x	•	•
<i>Globalization and rise in inequality</i>	↑	x	x	↑	↑	•	x	•	x	↑	•	↑
<i>Disruption of commodity flow / supply</i>	x	•	x	x	x	•	•	x	•	x	x	•
<i>Disruption of energy supplies</i>	•	•	x	x	x	•	x	•	x	x	x	•
<i>Financial crisis</i>	x	x	x	•	x	•	•	x	•	•	x	x
<i>Climate change, natural disasters</i>	•	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	x	x	•	x	x	↑
<i>Climate change in the Arctic</i>	x	x	↑	x	•	X	x	x	x	x	x	•
<i>Man-made disasters</i>	x	x	x	•	•	X	x	x	•	x	x	x

<i>Pandemics, epidemics</i>	↑	x	x	↑	x	•	x	x	•	x	x	•
<i>Attacks on citizens living abroad (e.g. kidnappings)</i>	x	x	x	•	•	X	x	x	x	x	x	x




↑	the threat is increasing / is likely to increase within the set horizon	m
•	threat without trend indication	
↓	the threat is decreasing	
x	threat not specified in the document	

**Annexe 4 - Capabilities of the armed forces of foreign countries in comparison with the Czech Republic**




# France

- Czech Republic, current situation
- Czech Republic, future situation
- France, current situation
- France, future situation




# Germany


- Czech Republic, current situation
- Czech Republic, future situation
- Germany, current situation
- Germany, future situation




# Netherlands




# Poland




# Austria




# Slovakia




# USA



# Great Britain





Analysis for an update of the Long term perspective for defence 2030. Strategic alternatives for the development of the armed forces of the Czech Republic.

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